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1 A sustained national case-study on these matters is the continuing series of reports by C. Gopalan and his associates, for India. A brief summary of his group's findings is in Gopalan (i 983). A great deal of the controversy generated by the publication of national estimates (such as those in India) of numbers of people below the poverty line has centred on the point that there are inter-regional and interpersonal variations in basic nutrition needs. It should also be noted that there is evidence that a person's metabolic efficiency in the use of energy adjusts, up to a point, to alterations in his energy intake. But even when such corrections are allowed for, worldwide incidence of undernourishment assumes an awesome figure well in excess of three hundred million people. 2 One may of course ask in what sense a person can be said to be rich and yet be hungry -unless it is by anorexic or other compulsion.
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In the sequel we will for the most part study policy implications. The model used to illustrate the theory is a fully 'general equilibrium' one. Involuntary unemployment will be shown to exist in the construct, not assumed; that is, wage rigidities will be explained, not hypothesised.1
We want to emphasise that the concept of undernourishment plays a central, operational, role in the model that we will develop here; and it is as well to make clear what we mean by this. Poverty, inequality, malnutrition and involuntary unemployment (or, more generally, surplus labour) have all been much discussed in the development literature. For example, the idea of 'basic needs', as it occurs in Streeten et al. (i 98 I), or the more general notion of 'capabilities', as developed in Sen (I 983), patently subsume the concept of food-adequacy-standard in their net. Now, malnutrition is not the same as hunger. There is not only discomfort in being malnourished, there is impairment in the capacity to engage in physical and mental activities, through illness or plain weakness. (If this is denied one must accept that malnutrition as a distinct concept is vacuous.) Any theory that incorporates 'basic needs' or 'capabilities' must then as a minimum acknowledge that at low nutrition levels there is some link between food intake and work capacity. For this reason it is a puzzle to us that the recent theoretical literature on absolute poverty has made little use of this link to its advantage when discussing the efficacy of food transfers (that is, their effect on growth of output). Reading this valuable literature is rather like seeing the grin but not the Cheshire Cat. Thus it is a commonplace to argue that food transfers to the very poor may lower growth rates in national product because of their detrimental influence on savings and investment, incentives and so forth. But this is only one side of the picture. The other side is what concepts such as 'basic needs' and 'capabilities' try among other things to capture, that a transfer from the well-fed to the undernourished will enhance output via increased work capacity of the impoverished. One does not know in advance which is the greater effect, but to ignore the latter is certain to yield biased estimates. We are fully awvare that these are difficult estimates to make, if only because data are sparse. But to date we do not even possess a theoretical scheme to tell us how we might go about thinking on the matter. For it is not obvious what is the pattern of resource allocation in a decentralised environment if and when the link between nutrition and work capacity assumes potency. The point is that the incidence of both malnutrition and involuntary unemployment need to be endogenous in a model which is used for the purposes of policy debates. One wants the model to identify which category of people will suffer from undernourishment. In particular, one wants it to identify those people who will be denied access to work that pays enough to enable them to produce enough for an employer to wish to hire them in the first place.
So as to keep the formal model as simple as possible we will consider a timeless world in which work capacity is related to food intake in the manner postulated by Leibenstein (I957) in his pioneering work. In Section II we will 1 There is now, following Harris and Todaro (1970) , a large development literature that has studied the implications of wage rigidities on migration decisions But for the most part such wage rigidities are not explained in this literature.
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[DECEMBER present the ingredients of our construction. The central theorems concerning the existence and general characteristics of involuntary unemployment equilibrium will be presented in Section III. In Section IV we postulate that the food and work capacity relation is a simple step-function and we then present a two-class economy in which equilibrium is unique and can be computed explicitly. Readers wishing to avoid the general arguments in Section III can go direct from Section III.2 (where market equilibrium is defined) to Section IV. The link between nutrition and work capacity is a most complex one and on reading some of the literature one detects that passions among analysts can run deep. A simple timeless model in this area will be found otiose even by some who find timeless models of normal production theory readily palatable. In Section V we therefore discuss several objections that can be raised about the reasonableness of our basic model and we argue that the general features that are highlighted in Section III are robust against generalisation. Section V contains a summary of our main conclusions. Proofs of theorems are relegated to the Appendix.
The model that we will develop in this essay postulates frictionless markets for all capital assets and a flawless competitive spirit among employers and workers. We wish to emphasise this point, because at the level of theoretical discourse it will not do to explain poverty, malnutrition and unemployment by an appeal to monopsonistic landlords, or predatory capitalists, or a traditionbound working class and leave it at that. That is far too easy, but more to the point, one is left vulnerable to the argument that this merely shows that governments should concentrate their attention on freeing markets from restrictive practices. It does not provide an immediate argument as to why governments, if they are able to, should intervene to ensure directly that people are not malnourished. Our formal model is a classical one. There are no missing markets. In particular, involuntary unemployment arising in it is not due to demand deficiency. To seal this point we will show in the sequel that equilibria in our model are Pareto-efficient. This means in particular that there are no policy options open to the government other than consumption or asset transfers. In the sequel, therefore, we will also study the impact of such policies.
II. THE MODEL
We begin by distinguishing labour-time from labour-power and observe that it is the latter which is an input in production. We consider a timeless construct and eschew uncertainty (see Section V for extensions). Consider a person who works in the economy under analysis for a fixed number of 'hours' -the duration of the analysis. Denote the labour power he supplies over the period by A and suppose that it is functionally related to his consumption, I, in the manner of the boldfaced curve in Fig. I (a) . (We should emphasise that we are thinking of labour power as an aggregate concept, capturing not only power in the thermodynarmtic sense, but also motivation, mental concentration, cognitive faculty, morbidity and so forth.)
The key features of the functional relationship are that it is increasing in the region of interest, and that at low consumption levels it increases at an tncreasing rate followed eventually by diminishing returns to further consumption. An alternative specification of the functional relationship, used, for example, by Bliss and Stern (I 978 b), is drawn in Fig. I (b) . Here, A is nil until a threshold level of consumption, I*, the resting metabolic rate (RMR). A(I) is an increasing function beyond I*, but it increases at a diminishing rate.
Two factors, land and labour-power, are involved in the production of 'rice.1 Land is homogeneous, workers are not. Denoting by T the quantity of land and by E the aggregate labour-power employed in production (i.e. the sum of individual labour powers employed) let F(E, T) be the output of rice, where the aggregate production function F(E, T) is assumed to be concave, twice differentiable, constant-returns-to-scale, increasing in E and T, and displaying A person with label n is called an n-person. The proportion of land he owns is t(n), so that Pt(n) is the total amount of land he owns; t(n) is thus a density function. Without loss of generality we label people in such a way that t(n) is nondecreasing in n. So t(n) is the land distribution in the economy and is assumed to be continuous. In Fig. 2 a typical distribution is drawn. All persons labelled o to n are landless. From n the t(n) function is increasing. Thus all persons numbered in excess of n own land, and the higher the n-value of a person the greater the amount of land owned by him. We will suppose that a person either does not work in the production sector or works for one unit of time.2 There are competitive markets for both land and labour power. Let r denote the rental rate on land. Then n-person's non-wage income is r tt (n). Each person has a reservation wage which must as a minimum be offered if he is to accept a job in the competitive Jabour market. For high n-persons this reservation wage will be high because they receive a high rental income. (Their utility of leisure is high.) For low n-persons, most especially the landless, the reservation wage is low, though possibly not nil. We are concerned with malnutrition, not starvation. In other words, we are supposing that these are normal times that are being modelled. For our purpose a precise definition of malnutrition is not required, even for the model economy under study. But for concreteness we are going to choose I -the consumption level in Fig. I (a) and I (b) at which marginal labour power equals average labour power -as the cut-off consumption level below which a person will be said to be undernourished. I is then the food-adequacy standard. Nothing of analytical consequence depends on this choice, but since the choice of I does have a rationale (see the example in Section IV) we may as well adopt it. All we need, for our purpose, is the assumption that the reservation wage of a landless person is one at which a person is undernourished, and thus less tharn 1.
We are then left with the concept of involuntary unemployment, which has yet to be defined. It is sharper than the notion of surplus labour, much discussed in the development literature. We have postulated the existence of a continuum of people with good reason. Involuntary unemployment in the sense that we want to think about here has to do with differential treatment meted out to similar people. Formally we have: 1 The theory that we are developing here can certainly accommodate Fig. I a, but it requires additional, fairly complicated exposition. So we avoid it. The reader can extend the arguments that follow to this case Indeed, we will indicate some of these extensions as we go along. In the text we shall continue to describe properties of various functions by the help of diagrams. In the Appendix these properties will be formally stated 2 Given that the A function is of the form depicted in Fig Next, define ,t* (n, r) as:
,u*(n, r) w* (n, r)/A[w*(n, r) + rt(n)].
Given r, ,u* (n, r) is therefore the minimum wage per unit of labour power for n-person, subject to the constraint that he is willing to work. In Fig. 4(a) 
III. 3. Simple Characteristics of Market Equilibrium
In what follows we will characterise equilibria diagrammatically. To do this we merely superimpose the horizontal curve ,u = ,u on to Fig. 4 (a) . There are three different types of equilibria, or regimes, depending on the size of P, the parameter we vary in the next three subsections. Specifically, we have Theorem 2. A competitive equilibrium is in one of three possible regimes, depending on the total size of land, P, and the distribution of land. Given the latter: (i) If T is sufficiently small, ,2 < f/A(1), and the economy is characterised by malnourishment among all the landless and some of the near-landless (Fig. 5 (a) ) .
(2) There are ranges of moderate values of 1 in which fl = 1/A(1), and the economy is characterised by malnourishment and involuntary unemployment among a fraction of the landless (Fig. 5 (b) ).
(3) If T is sufficiently large, Au > 1/A (1), and the economy is characterised by full employment and an absence of malnourishment (Fig. 5 (c) ) .
Proof. See Appendix. We will discuss these equilibrium regimes successively in Sections III. 4-III. 6. But first we note that among those in employment persons owning more land are doubly blessed: they not only enjoy greater rental income, their wages are higher. notes that all n-persons between n, and n2 are employed in the production of rice. Typically, the borderline nl-person will be one for whom the market wage w-(nl) will exceed his reservation wage iii[rt(nl) 1]. We will assume this in the exposition. From condition (ii) of Definition 2, we observe that all n-persons below n, and above n2 are out of the market: the former because their labour power is too expensive, the latter because their reservation wages are too high -they are too rich.
It should also be noted that in this regime, all the landless are malnourished. Indeed, it can be verified that (if, as we are assuming in this essay, malnourishment incomes are defined to be those below I) all persons between n and n1 are also malnourished, their rental income is too meagre. Finally, note that some of the employed are also malnourished, which is verifiable by noting that employed persons slightly to the right of n, consume less than I. 
III. 7. Growth as a Means of Reducing the Incidence of Malnourishment and Unemployment
It is difficult to resist extending the conclusions of the timeless structure and introducing time. So we will not try. One can imagine an economy with a small P and a given distribution of land, t(n). An equilibrium is characterised by Fig. 5 (a) . If the propertied class, which is well-to-do at the equilibrium, accumulates in land improvement -that is, in capital that improves the productivity of land -Twill increase. Assuming that land distribution, t(n), remains approximately the same, it would follow that with P increasing more and more, the economy will after some time enter the regime depicted by Fig. 5(b) , and eventually the final regime of Fig. 5 (c) ,1 It is only in the final regime that no one is undernourished. We take it that this is what 'trickle-down' theory amounts to. Of course, if we introduce time we must also introduce a capital market and allow peasants to borrow. As accumulation (increase in T) takes place one expects the equilibrium piece-rate to increase in regime I. Thus borrowing will, ceteris paribus, accelerate the transition from regime I to regime 2, since a peasant who borrows and is employed, consumes in excess of his current income and thus increases his productivity. On the other hand, if the economy is a closed one this borrowing must be from high n-persons and loans are an alternative to land improvement. This -will lower the progress of the economy. In regime 2, accumulation raises employment rather than the piece-rate. As the end of regime 2 approaches, all landless peasants may wish to borrow. A capital market will modify the 'trickle', but it will not eliminate any of the three regimes. 
F(E, T) = EaT1-a (o < a < I).
In words, (3) says that the food-productivity relationship is a step-function, (4) says that it is a two-class economy, (5) says that the reservation wage is nil for all persons, and (6) 
Now, in regime 2 one must have o < n1 < n < I. Using this in equation (I3) we conclude that given n, for the economy to be in regime 2, 1' must satisfy the inequalities: ineqalites: (I-n) (I/aYa) 11(1-a) < < (I/aXa) 11(1-a),
that is, if I is neither too large nor too small (Section III. 5). Fronm (14) we conclude that the economy is in regime 3 if t'> (flaXa) 111-a), no matter what the distribution of land holdings is, a result which we will generalise in the sequel. Since n1 = o in regime 3 (Fig. -(c) 
From (14) we also conclude that the economy is in regime I (Section II. 4
and Fig. 5 (a) A depend on the parameter m. A person is then denoted  by a pair of numbers (m, n) and in the obvious notation, A = A(Ih, m) where nw + r t (n). We may now define the population to be a uniform bivariate distribution on (m, n) pairs and reconstruct our analysis. Nothing of substance will change.
(b) Household Decisions. Notice that this device can also be used to distinguish people by their family size and thus their family commitments. A person with a family does not consume the entire income he collects. He shares with his family. Ceterisparibus the larger is his family the less he consumes of the income he collects. If it is reasonable to simplify and suppose that members in a household share total income in some fixed manner, the foregoing index scheme will suffice. If not, we will need to formulate the manner in which a typical household decides to share its income and then label people as well by their household size. The number of dependants (and this will of course be endogenous in the model because the person in question may have a spouse or a sibling who also is in search of a job outside) and the sharing rule will (endogenously) tell us how much of a person's income will be consumed by him. The rest of the argument is monumentally tedious, but routine.
It is often thought that the concept of involuntary unemployment is of necessity restricted to a wage economy and that a recognition that people do household chores and cultivate family plots, will spell ruin for the concept and that we will need to rethink the entire issue. Not so. The concept has to do with work options open to a person and to those who are similar to him. It is a special case of a concern with consumption options open to a person and to those who are similar to him. The concept has to do with localised inequality in available options, or horizontal inequity in work options. Definition I can easily be generalised for non-market environments.
It is a profound tragedy that a family in absolute poverty not only has to make do with so little, it cannot even afford to share its poverty equally. In his highly original analytical work MIirrlees (I 975) pointed out that a poor family is forced to divide its consumption unequally among its members when the relation between food intake and work capacity assumes the forms we have considered in this essay. These considerations and the related issue of gender-bias in nutrition-status within the household bear on household decisions. Including them in an analysis will not affect our general conclusions regarding interfamily transactions, the subject of this essay. A person's past nutritional status is like a capital asset and when this affects present and future productivity there is a problem of intertemporal externality. Unless long-term labour contracts can be signed -and the existence of casual labour suggests that they often are not -employers will not be able to appropriate all the future benefits from employing persons. As one would expect, such missing markets will tend to depress wages. (See Mazumdar (I959).) But nothing of substance will be affected in our analysis. A person's history can be telling and very pernicious for him. For example, it has been suggested to us by a referee that if our model economy of Section III languishes in a stationary state (no accumulation) in regime 2 then our concept of involuntary unemployment is useless because on average all the landless will be employed the same number of periods. (This would be so if in each period a lottery 1 An extreme case is slavery On the constraints imposed on the activities of slaves see Genovese (I974). Rodgers (I975) and Stiglitz (I976) analysed an economy in which the landowners' reservation wage is in effect infinity. Thus the only possible workers are the landless. But in this case it makes no difference whether there is a single employer (i.e. labour monopsony) or many: the outcome is the same! Because of this happy analytical coincidence Rodgers and Stiglitz did not need to develop the apparatus required to discuss non-monopsonistic markets, a need which cannot be avoided if one wishes to explore the implications of land reform (see the sequel); for, after a reform the labour market cannot be monopsonistic.
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[DECEMBER is used to ration the labour market.) So then over the long haul there is equality among the landless. This is certainly so. But now introduce a tiny bit of history. Suppose a person's nutrition status in one period affects his A function in the next period. Suppose the landless are all identical to begin with. In the first period a fraction will be employed. Which particular people we cannot tell in advance because a lottery is in use. But in the next period the previouslyemployed have a slight advantage (because of their better nutrition history). From then on, most of these same people will find employment, and all of those who languished in the first period, through bad luck, will continue to languish; no longer through bad luck but through cumulative causation. The evils of malnutrition and involuntary unemployment cannot be exorcised by mathematical sophistry.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
People without assets are doubly cursed. Not only do they not enjoy non-labour income, they are at a disadvantage in the labour market relative to those who do possess assets. If the efficiency-piece-rate of a wealthy man is too high for anyone to wish to hire him it is because his reservation wage is too high. He is not unemployed. Not so for the assetless. Such a man's efficiency-piece-rate is high not because he does not want to work but because his entire food intake must be wage-based. Thus he either cannot offer the labour quality the market demands and so must languish in a state of malnourishment (Section III. 4, Regime i), or can, but is, if unlucky, prevented from joining the labour force because of rationing (Section III. 5, Regime 2). In the latter case he is involuntarily unemployed and malnourished. The central purpose of this essay has been to illustrate these points and to explore their ramifications. We have argued in this essay that the market may force identical persons to be treated differently -in particular to award some a job and adequate nutrition and to keep others out in a state of malnourishment -and in the sequel we will show that this can happen even if the economy is rich enough in assets to feed all adequately. The reason is that because a large fraction of the population is landless the market cannot 'afford' to employ all. Inequality as such is not the worst of evils. But malnourishment in the midst of potential plenty (as in Theorem 4 of the sequel) is not far from being one. While it is true that if accumulation -e.g., via an improvement in land -proceeds, unemployment, and thus malnutrition, will be eradicated in the model economy in time (Theorem 2). However, it may be a long while coming. For the immediate future the 'quantity' of land cannot be altered much. But the extreme inequality in food consumption which the market inflicts can be countered. For economies not generously endowed with physical assets the competitive market mechanism must be judged an unmitigated disaster. The policy implications in the model economy are clear enough and will be explored in the sequel.
At the mathematical level it is easy to see why, despite pure competition, there is involuntary unemployment when the number of landless people is large. It is because of the inherent increasing-returns-to-scale in the food-productivity i986] INEQUALITY, MALNUTRITION AND UNEMPLOYMENT I03I relation of a person at low consumption levels ( Fig. I (a), (b) ).' It is because of this that the theory outlined here is so different from the Arrow-Debreu theory of perfect competition with convex structures. We have argued that given the land distribution function t(n), it is only when the total quantity of land is large (when Pis large) that pure competition in the economy in question merges with the standard Arrow-Debreu theorv (Theorem 2, regime 3). In the sequel (Theorem 4) we will show that if there is sufficient land to feed all but it is not a land-rich country then competitive equilibrium in our model economy merges with the standard Arrow-Debreu equilibrium only if land distribution is sufficiently equal. In the sequel we will also show (see Theorem 5 in the sequel) that if the aggregate quantity of land is very large land distribution does not matter as regards employment and malnutrition: an equilibrium is a conventional Arrow-Debreu one. We take this to mean that the Arrow-Debreu theory pertains only to an economy which is asset-rich. This is not to say that an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium has much to commend it from the point of view of the distribution of welfare. There is, however, nothing new in this point and it is not the one we want to make here. The point we are making here is that the Arrow-Debreu theory does not have a vocabulary either for malnutrition or for involuntary unemployment.2 The central purpose of this essay has been to provide here a simple theory that can accommodate these notions, and in particular to expose their link with the inequality in asset ownership. 
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